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Abstract
The central pillar of European climate policy, the European Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), is
currently under scrutiny, as the allowance price is persistently low at around 5€/tCO2. The cap was
met and emissions actually declined in recent years, ensuring the environmental effectiveness of the
scheme. However, the low price may affect the long-term cost-effectiveness of the instrument by
reducing the incentive for investment and deployment of low carbon technologies. No significant
increase in the allowance price is expected before 2020, and probably not beyond, without reform.
While the reasons for the price decline are controversial, empirical analysis shows that only a small
portion of price fluctuations can be explained by factors such as the economic crisis, renewable
deployment or international offsets. Therefore, it is likely that political factors and regulatory
uncertainty have played a key role in the price decline. As a consequence, any reform of the EU ETS
has to deliver a mechanism that reduces such uncertainty and stabilizes expectations of market
participants. The Market Stability Reserve proposed by the EU Commission is unlikely to address the
current problem of price uncertainty and insufficient dynamic efficiency. The key element of the
alternative reform proposal described in this paper is to set a price collar in the EU ETS with lower
and upper boundaries. This is likely to reinforce the long-term credibility and reliability of the price
signal. In addition, a price for GHG emissions not covered by the EU ETS has to be set. If additional
market failures prevent the market from functioning efficiently, specific policy instruments related
to innovation and technology diffusion should be implemented in addition to carbon pricing. Carbon
leakage could be addressed through tailor-made trade policies. In parallel, increasing the coalition of
countries included in the carbon pricing should remain a priority. This reform package would bring
the EU ETS back to life, while avoiding a relapse into potentially costly and inefficient national
climate and energy policies.
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1. Introduction
The EU implemented the EU ETS as the central cornerstone of EU climate policy. It is the first largescale CO2 emission trading system in the world, offering the world community a unique opportunity
to distill empirical lessons for the operation and design of an emissions trading system. This is
particularly salient, as trading schemes for GHG reductions are currently in the process of being
adopted in many other world regions including California, Quebec, and several Chinese cities and
provinces. At the same time, however, the performance of the EU ETS is under great scrutiny. Many
believe that the carbon price it sets is far too low to incentivize long-term investments in low-carbon
technologies.
To progress beyond a narrow discussion of the adequate allowance price level, this paper evaluates
the performance of the EU ETS and the different EU ETS reform options along the three criteria of
environmental effectiveness, cost-effectiveness and political feasibility. Our analysis concludes that
the environmental effectiveness of the EU ETS is given (in fact, the emission target has been
overachieved), but that the EU ETS lacks dynamic efficiency. The EU Commission has suggested
addressing this problem by introducing a reform that manipulates the supply of EU allowances
(EUAs), i.e. the Market Stability Reserve. However, we show that this reform proposal does not
address the problem of dynamic efficiency, mainly because the interplay between the magnitude of
the EUA surplus and the EUA price formation seems incomprehensible from an inter-temporal
perspective. It also fails to address the problem of overlapping policies arising from the existence of
supplementary policy instruments at the EU Member State level that could undermine the overall
performance of the EU ETS. By contrast, our analysis clearly shows that instead of a narrow reform
of the EU ETS focusing on the EUA surplus, a comprehensive reform addressing a several aspects of
carbon pricing is required. This includes (i) setting a price collar within the EU ETS, (ii) expanding the
EU ETS to other sectors (e.g. transport, buildings) (iii) addressing additional market failures through
other policy instruments and (iv) addressing the possible problem of carbon leakage by expanding
the group of countries that adopt comparable carbon prices.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 will give an ex-post evaluation of the performance of
the EU ETS in terms of environmental effectiveness and allowance price formation, while section 3
evaluates the cost-effectiveness. Section 4 provides an overview of the different reform proposals
and analyses the Market Stability Reserve in detail. Section 5 describes a comprehensive reform of
the EU ETS in view of establishing the long-term credibility of European climate and energy policy.
Section 6 concludes and addresses political feasibility.

2. The EU ETS: ex-post analysis
Pricing carbon is essential for climate policy. It directly addresses the market failure related to
Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions and harmonizes the price signal indicating the level at which
internal GHG reductions are more cost-effective than purchasing and surrendering EU Allowances
(EUAs). If implemented properly, this promises to simultaneously meet the objectives of
environmental effectiveness (the permitted emissions given by the cap) and economic efficiency (all
organizations have an incentive to implement internal abatement options cheaper than the
allowance price).
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The EU aims to reduce all GHG emissions by 80-95% by 2050. This long-term vision is grounded in a
2020 mid-term strategy with 20% GHG reduction by 2020, as agreed in the “EU climate and energy
package” in 2007 2. To achieve this, the EU Emissions Trading System was implemented in 2005,
covering the power sector, the energy-intensive industrial sector and commercial aviation which,
together, are responsible for about 45% of all GHG emissions originating in the European Union. In
particular, the 2003 EU ETS Directive states that the trading scheme aims to “promote reductions of
greenhouse gas emissions in a cost-effective and economically efficient manner.” However, the time
frame for assessing efficiency is not specified in the Directive. However, it is fair to assume that the
EU ETS must enable the development and deployment of low-carbon technology in order to keep
the promise of cost-effectiveness in the long-term. Achieving emissions reductions exclusively
through output reductions rather than through a shift to new technologies would not be
economically efficient. Therefore, this paper evaluates the EU ETS against its capacity to foster first
R&D and then investment in new technologies.
The EU ETS is the first, and to date the largest, system for trading GHG emission allowances in the
world 3. A complex and functioning market infrastructure has emerged including periodic auctioning
of permits, trading amongst regulated entities and financial intermediaries, a centralized emission
registry, and a system of monitoring, reporting and verification of emissions.
Since 2013, the EU ETS directive foresees that emissions within the EU ETS will decline by a Linear
Reduction Factor (LRF) of 1.74% p.a., so that emissions will be reduced by 21% between 2005 and
2020 4. In volume this means a reduction from 2,501 Mt CO2 in 2005 to 1,904 Mt CO2 in 2020 5, giving
an approximate reduction of allowances of 38 Mt CO2 per year. If the LRF of 1.74% p.a. is continued
until 2050, a 71% reduction will be achieved by 2050 within the EU ETS sector (long-term cumulative
cap). An increasing share of emission allowances will be auctioned (starting with 40% in 2013), but
free allocation is retained in order to address concerns about competitiveness (see section 5.4).

2.1.

Evaluating the environmental effectiveness of the EU ETS

In order to evaluate the environmental effectiveness of the EU ETS, emission reductions within the
EU ETS sectors have to be analyzed to determine, in particular, whether these reductions can be
attributed to the EU ETS or whether other factors such as the economic recession, or renewable and
energy efficiency policies are more relevant. According to an overview of studies, emissions within
the EU ETS 6 reduced by around 3% of estimated business-as-usual emissions in Phase I and during
the first two years of Phase II. As the annual cap is observed, and non-compliance faces severe
penalties, the EU ETS ensures that environmental effectiveness, as indicated by the legally binding
cap, is delivered. However, between 2009 and 2013, actual emissions stayed below the annual cap
(see Figure 1). This means that temporarily the annual cap was not binding. Thus, the emission
target has in fact been overachieved. In this situation, a study by Gloaguen and Alberola 7 evaluate
the drivers behind the cumulative emission reductions in EU ETS sectors between 2005 and 2011
(compared to a business-as-usual scenario), which they find to be between 1,152 and 1,324 Mt CO2.
2
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The study attributes relative shares of the different factors that contributed to these reductions by
applying econometric methods. They find that policies from the EU climate and energy package for
2020 (GHG reduction, renewables, energy efficiency) might have contributed to a reduction of
around 766-805 Mt CO2. The main contribution was from the expansion of renewables energies
(60%-80%), followed by energy efficiency measures (20%-30%), while the impact of the carbon price
signal was relatively small (only 0-10%) 8. In addition, according to the study, the economic crisis led
to an emissions reduction of around 296-346 Mt CO2 and fuel price variations to another 262 Mt CO2
(compared to a business-as-usual scenario). To sum up, while the annual cap of the EU ETS has been
achieved for each year of its operation – and in fact, has been overachieved, as depicted in Figure 1,
leading to the accumulation of an emission “surplus”– the main reasons for these emissions
reductions were factors other than the EUA price. This does not imply that a CO2 price does not lead
to emission reductions. Although the analysis shows that the economic downturn and the
development of renewables have been the main drivers of the fall in emissions, the combination of
these two factors has made it unnecessary for market participants to undertake additional
abatement. However, it is important to note that - as long as the allowance price is positive - factors
and measures in addition to the carbon price simply provide different ways of abating emissions (e.g.
renewables or energy efficiency); they do not lead to additional reductions of total emissions as the
cap remains unchanged and banking, i.e. the possibility to use EUA certificates in a later period, is
allowed. In the following we refer to this problem as “overlapping policies”.

Figure 1: Historical developments of EU ETS annual cap (Cap), annual verified emissions from sources covered by the EU
ETS (Emissions), annual offsets surrendered for compliance (Offsets) and average December future prices (CO2 price).
Source: Grosjean et al. (2014).
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While EU ETS emissions were de facto reduced in 2012 and 2013, a structural reform of the EU ETS
began to be debated. This debate was mainly triggered by the marked and persistent drop of the EU
allowance (EUA) price (see next section for details). As a short-term measure, in 2014, the
Commission introduced the so-called “backloading” that postpones the auctioning of 900 million
allowances from 2013-2015 until 2019-2020. During 2014 the auction volume will be reduced by 400
million allowances, in 2015 by 300 million, and in 2016 by 200 million. However, this temporary
measure does not change the overall cap during the third trading period of the EU ETS. In 2014, with
its new proposal for a climate and energy framework for 2030, the EU Commission has proposed a
structural reform of the EU ETS for the period beyond 2020.

2.2.

Evaluating the price drivers in the EU ETS

The EUA price has experienced a sharp decline during the second phase of the EU ETS and has
remained relatively low since then. In particular, it dropped from 30€ per ton of CO2 in mid-2008 to
as low as 3€ in April 2013. Several factors are widely assumed to be behind the deterioration of the
EUA price 9: (i) the deep and lasting economic crisis in the European Union 10, (ii) the large influx of
CDM credits 11, and (iii) overlapping EU member state policies, e.g. renewable supporting schemes 12.
Only a very few studies, however, provide a fully-fledged empirical analysis of the price drivers. This
is especially relevant because the annual emission cap in the EU ETS currently does not constrain the
emissions. As discussed above, the latter are indeed driven down by lower economic activity and the
renewables deployment. Prices in this regime, on the other hand, reflect expectations of future
scarcities, which are inter alia subject to the credibility of the long-term political commitment of the
cap in the EU ETS. The positive allowance price indicates that the cumulative cap (as determined by
the linear reduction factor) is still binding but at the same time the low price level reflects that
market participants anticipate only a modest long-term scarcity of allowances in the market.
Before reviewing the literature, it is helpful to clarify the main pricing mechanism in an emissions
trading scheme such as the EU ETS. According to economic theory, the allowance price should reflect
market fundamentals related to marginal abatement cost, i.e. the cost of abating an additional unit
of CO2, over the entire duration of the EU ETS if the cap is binding 13. In the power sector, the most
important short-term abatement channel is through switching of input fuels, the prices of which
should be reflected in EUA prices if the market is efficient. Other price fundamentals include, for
example, economic activity and weather conditions, since they determine baseline emissions and
therefore the demand for abatement 14. It is important to note that from an inter-temporal
perspective, even if the cap in the current trading phase is non-binding today, expectations of future
scarcities (or the long-term cumulative cap) in coming trading phases should still be reflected in
future allowance prices. While movements in the demand for EUAs are influenced by marginal
abatement costs, the supply is determined to a large extent by political decisions such as
adjustments to the linear reduction factor or backloading. Thus, current and future supply and
demand paths are at the heart of the price formation process in the market and essential for
ensuring dynamic efficiency of the mitigation strategies chosen over time.
9
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Empirical evidence relating to these theoretical expectations is limited to Phase I (2005-2007) and
the early stage of Phase II (2008-2012) of the EU ETS when the EUA price was still around 15€ /
tCO2 15. The common finding for this period of relatively high carbon prices is that the identified
marginal abatement cost drivers had only a limited influence on EUA price formation and that
different dynamics were at work as the EU ETS market design evolved and matured 16 . Yet, evidence
as to the causes of the EU ETS price drop over the period 2011-2013, which led to the persistently
low EUA price level today, is just emerging.
A recent study 17 expands existing research by conducting a first ex post analysis for the entire Phase
II of the EU ETS and the first year of Phase III. In particular, the study empirically examines whether
and to what extent monthly EUA price changes are driven by three factors identified above
(economic recession, international credits, and renewable policies). The overall finding is that
demand-side fundamentals explain very little (see Figure 2) and fuel prices (coal and gas) in
particular, no longer have the highly significant impact they had in Phase I. Instead, expectations of
future economic development are positively and significantly correlated with the EUA price, which is
in contrast to Phase I, where this relationship was weak 18. Variations in economic activity indeed
prove to be the most important abatement-related determinant of EUA price changes.
The study also assesses the relative importance of the substantial use of Kyoto credits, especially in
2011 and 2012. This influx might be attributed to the collapse in credit prices, but also to the
European Commission’s decision to exclude credits originating from hydrofluorocarbons (HFC) and
adipic acid nitrous oxide (N2O) projects from Phase III. In addition, they only allow new Certified
Emission Reductions (CERs) if they originate from least-developed countries 19. Large amounts of
cheap credits were surrendered in the second half of phase II as a result. Even though the study finds
a statistically significant negative influence of the issued CERs, the impact on the EUA price is minute.
On the one hand, this could be because the maximum use of offsets was anticipated when setting
the cap and only the timing has changed. On the other hand, it could mean that the data available
for the analysis were limited and the result should be interpreted with some caution.
Finally, the study finds a statistically significant correlation between changes in renewable
generation and EUA prices, but the magnitude of the impact is small. In fact, the development of
renewables was expected based on the implementation of the 2020 package and so this effect
should have been factored in, unless market participants did not believe in the possibility of
achieving the renewables target 20.
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Figure 2: Only about 10% of the price fluctuations can be explained by market fundamentals (left). The right part shows
the different contributions of the different drivers. Source: Koch et al. (2014)

The bottom line of the study is that 90% of the variations of EUA price changes remain unexplained
by the abatement-related fundamentals on the demand side (see Figure 2). Consequently, the
quantitative analysis does not support the widely-held view that negative demand shocks (economic
crisis, renewables, Kyoto credits etc.) are the main cause of the weak carbon price signal. It should
again be noted, that this finding is based on a thorough empirical analysis, which has also been
called for by previous studies 21. In particular, the finding for the role of the economic downturn is in
line with the common intuition reflected in the current debate. However, the magnitude of its
explanatory power is more limited than expected. Combined with previous findings for Phase I, this
indicates that marginal abatement only weakly explains price changes in an EU ETS regime with nonbinding annual caps. 22
If demand-side fundamentals explain so little of the price decline in the EU ETS, it is necessary to
have a closer look at the supply side. This is mainly influenced by political decisions. Regulatory
announcements concerning the cap should have a major impact on prices – either through changing
expected supply or, if they are not credible, by creating uncertainty and further depressing the price.
The above-mentioned study gives indicative evidence that such policy events (e.g. the
announcement of the backloading proposal) and the lack of their credibility could be alternative
explanations for the low price, which is a key issue for future research.
It is clear that any discussion of policy reform, and an evaluation of the menu of options available for
this, needs to be informed by a thorough understanding of market behavior and the dynamics of
price formation. The economic crisis, and overlapping policies (and more specifically support of
renewables) did reduce emissions (cf. section 2.1), but the above study finds that they are not solely
responsible for the EUA price changes. This may, in particular, be the case because market
participants do not expect a strict 2020 cap, as signaled by low futures prices.

3. Evaluating the dynamic efficiency of the EU ETS
In view of the low EUA price since early 2013, the key concern regarding EU ETS performance is its
dynamic efficiency. Dynamic efficiency relates to the ability of the EU ETS, and in particular its
21
22
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carbon price signal, to achieve its cumulative cap, as determined by the Linear Reduction Factor, at
least cost. This can be done by optimally incentivizing mitigation efforts, investments, and research
and development (R&D) into low carbon technologies over time. Evidence suggests that this is a
broadly shared concern in the current debate over EU ETS reform 23, and is exemplified in the
following EU Commission statement prompting its January 2014 reform proposal: “A large surplus
hence strongly confounds the signal for investments, which are necessary for the transition towards
a low-carbon economy, including energy supply. It is a problem as it is expected to result in locking
the EU into high carbon capital and investment, in particular considering the currently high gas to
coal price ratio” 24. This indicates that the Commission is concerned about inefficient investment
patterns creating a lock-in of carbon-intensive infrastructure investments today (such as in coal
power plants) that might make future ambitious mitigation efforts, as indicated by the long-term EU
decarbonization objective, disproportionally expensive.
In a perfect market (and perfect regulation) the EU ETS would incentivize a dynamically cost
effective allocation of all available mitigation options over time. This section addresses the problem
of how to evaluate the effectiveness of the actual EU ETS market outcome. It reviews three
interrelated reasons for concern over the dynamic efficiency of the EU ETS: the low EUA price,
significant uncertainty, and the potential proliferation of unilateral Member State policies.

3.1.

Is there a problem with the low EUA price?

Figure 3 shows the actual near-future (blue line) and far-future (red line) price for EUAs. Both
reference price series have declined in the past. An interesting feature of the figure is that the farfuture 2020 price is always higher than the near-future price. However, this price spread shows a
strong decrease over time. Currently, futures contracts for prompt EUA delivery trade at around 5€ /
tCO2, and futures contracts for delivery in the year 2020 are only slightly higher at around 7-8€ /
tCO2. It is important to note that the 2020 price is not zero because market participants expect at
least some scarcity in the future. This is in sharp contrast to Phase I, where zero prices did indeed
occur. 25 However, the 2020 price level is relatively low reflecting moderate expectations of future
scarcity. The key concern regarding the dynamic efficiency of the EU ETS is rooted in the perception
that these actual EUA prices (specifically, the far-future 2020 price) are ‘too low’. However, such a
judgment raises the question of what an adequate EUA price path would look like over time.
Economy-energy models construct stylized representations of relevant economic and technological
processes, and offer benchmarks for assessing dynamic efficiency of actual observable market
outcomes. In fact, they offer the only reliable benchmark available for judging whether EUA prices
are ‘too low’ or ‘too high’ from this perspective. Alternative approaches for judging ‘the right’ EUA
price, such as focusing on whether specific technologies such as CCS, certain renewables, or coal-togas switch in the power sector are triggered, only consider a subset of the available options of the
models. Despite the caveats discussed below, economy-energy models are the only available tools
providing integrated and systemic views on the diverse relevant factors (available abatement
options, plausible technological change rates, allowance demand etc.) that need to be taken into
account in an informed assessment on whether the EU ETS is on the right trajectory.
23
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24

8

Figure 3: EUA price for nearest futures contract and for December 2020 futures contract traded on the ICE ECX platform
26
for the time span 2011-2013. Source: ICE Futures Europe .

These economy-energy models reveal that current price paths in the EU ETS are not in line with
socially optimal CO2 price paths 27. CO2 prices from a recent model comparison exercise 28 in fact
show that prices increase over time which is in sharp contrast to the declining trend in observed EUA
prices. For 2015 the socially optimal CO2 price paths, calculated by the models for the default case,
range from about 10 to 20€ / tCO2, and for 2020 the optimal price range across models spans from
20 to 70€ / tCO2 (see Figure 4, left panel). Comparison with the 2020 futures contract, which
currently trades at around 7-8€ / tCO2, suggests that actual 2020 prices deviate substantially from
the socially optimal price and that actual EUA prices are too low relative to these dynamic efficiency
benchmarks. Clearly the EU ETS is not currently on a dynamically cost-effectiveness pathway. The
reasons for this could be two-fold. On the one hand, the problem could be rooted in lower businessas-usual expectations of market participants compared to energy-economy models; for example
expectations of a slower economic recovery or technological breakthroughs. On the other hand, the
lack of credibility of the long-term cap could be the driver of the divergence.

26

www.theice.com
The “optimal price” refers to the carbon price trajectory for achieving a given climate target at least cost
over time, and "social" refers to the overall welfare perspective on these costs in contrast to costs of individual
market participants.
28
The EMF28 Study on Scenarios for Transforming the European Energy System (Knopf et al., 2013b).
27
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Figure 4: CO2 price trajectories for a cost-effective long-term pathway with an 80% reduction in GHG emissions by 2050
within Europe. Left: with default technology setting; right: without CCS. The blue box contains the 50% interval, the
whiskers mark the 90% interval and the straight line marks the median over 12 different energy-economy models. The
red line marks the values for the PRIMES model applied in the EU Commission’s “Energy Roadmap 2050”. Source: EMF28
model comparison, Knopf et al. (2013b).

It is certainly necessary to treat the CO2 prices indicated by models with care. First, the scenarios
indicated in Figure 4 are optimal economy-wide carbon prices. However, EU Commission modeling
indicates that actual policies should generate roughly harmonized implicit carbon prices across
sectors 29. Also, earlier studies from academia indicate that the actual carbon price in the EU ETS
tends to be too low relative to the implicit price in non-EU ETS sectors. This re-enforces the
indication that actual EUA prices are too low relative to the dynamic efficiency benchmark. Second,
there are strong differences in optimal CO2 prices across models reflecting different assumptions in
the operation of energy, the economy, and EUA markets, as well as different assumptions about the
future development of key parameters such as GDP growth, energy efficiency improvements,
renewable and fossil cost developments, and additional and overlapping policies. Uncertainty in
these estimates and their relevance for policy design are discussed in the subsequent paragraphs.
What will be stressed here is that the significant divergence between actual market prices and the
benchmarks indicated by modeling, raises concerns as to whether the futures price signal of the EU
ETS guiding investments today, and locking in potentially GHG intensive infrastructures (such as coal
power plants) for decades, is in line with what long-term dynamic efficiency considerations would
suggest it should be.
The reasons for the divergence between actual prices and model results are not well understood in
the literature and minimally discussed so far. In the following section we will examine significant
uncertainties both on the allowance demand side and allowance supply side as potential
explanations for this divergence.

3.2.

Uncertainties in the EUA price development

As discussed in the previous section, the formation of current futures prices hinges critically on the
perceived supply-demand balance in the EU ETS market over the next few decades. These significant
uncertainties are an important reason for the divergence between actual prices and socially optimal
prices and further impede the dynamic efficiency of the EU ETS.
29

The Impact Assessment (European Commission, 2014d) shows that that the (implicit) carbon prices within
and outside the ETS sectors are virtually the same, i.e. in both cases a price of 22 €/tCO2 by 2030 for the
GHG40 scenario.
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Demand-side uncertainties are a primary potential driving force behind the divergence. If market
agents expected lower future GDP growth and thus lower future business-as-usual emissions than
assumed in the modeling exercises, the EUA market price would be below the modeled efficient
price trajectory. This uncertainty can be further exemplified by considering modeling sensitivity
studies which find that price formation is indeed particularly sensitive to economic development. A
sensitivity analysis for the EUA price in the PRIMES model for different GDP growth path
assumptions shows a divergence of expected optimal prices between 6-50€ / tCO2 in the year 2030 30.
Furthermore, the uncertainty over technological development is a crucial determinant for the price
path. The EMF28 model comparison shows that without CCS availability, the optimal price path
shows a slightly higher CO2 price and specifically a much more robust picture across the models for
2020 (see Figure 4, right panel).
Another explanation for the divergence could be that market agents expect more lenient supply, i.e.
they do not find the cap announced by policymakers credible and they expect it to be relaxed in the
future. Both the uncertainty of future targets and the credibility of long-term commitment might
therefore push the market EUA price below that in the cost effective modeling projections. Yet
another explanation might be that the uncertainties over both supply and demand are so large that
private agents resort to discounting long-term supply-demand balances in the EU ETS and the
expected scarcity of allowances several decades away, putting more weight on the current
(over)supply-demand balance in the market, thus depressing prices.
The myriad of uncertainties may not only drive a wedge between actual market prices and the
socially optimal benchmarks, they may also present direct challenges to the investment planning of
regulated companies. ‘Too much’ uncertainty can further hamper dynamic efficiency by halting
investment activities altogether. Real options studies 31 show that the value of information,
measured by the willingness of investors and producers to pay for information on the correct
CO2 price path, is high when the supply of allowances is frequently adjusted. In addition, the larger
the price uncertainty, the larger the cumulative CO2 emissions over the forthcoming century, as the
transition to less CO2-intensive technologies is increasingly postponed. This indicates that both
environmental and dynamic efficiency will be negatively affected by uncertainty in the policy process
and a consequent uncertainty in the supply. In general, such studies show that climate change
policies that are stable over a certain length of time outperform frequently changing policies both in
terms of emissions savings and cost effectiveness. It is worth noting that this challenge to investors
might prevail even if current and future EUA prices are higher than they are now.
In summary, supply-demand uncertainties create significant policy design challenges for
policymakers aimed at ensuring dynamic efficiency. This critical aspect will be central to the
discussion of the EU Commission reform proposal for a market stability reserve (see section 4.2) as
well as the alternative EU ETS reform package (see Section 5) below.

3.3.

Overlap with unilateral Member State policies

The overlap of policy instruments between the EU ETS and individual nations causes further concern
regarding the dynamic efficiency of the EU ETS. In view of the currently low EUA price (section 3.1)
and the indicated uncertainties (section 3.2), some Member States might increasingly resort to
30
31

Capros (2014), presented at the Euro-CASE workshop, see footnote Errore. Il segnalibro non è definito..
E.g. Fuss et al. (2009)
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national mitigation policies in order to achieve their more ambitious domestic mitigation goals.
However, reliance on domestic policy instruments would create an inefficient pattern of regulation
across the EU and would add to the factors working towards reducing the EUA price. The EU ETS is
embedded in a multi-level governance structure, with Member States having diverging preferences
over their technology mix and level of climate policy ambition. The EU ETS is not the only instrument
for climate and energy policy, but based on the national sovereignty of the energy mix, Member
States can implement additional measures, such as renewable support schemes, energy efficiency
measures, or additional domestic carbon prices (UK) that interact with the EU ETS. This is likely to
intensify asymmetries in marginal abatement costs across Member States and thus increase overall
policy cost. In addition, these policies also do only reallocate but not on net reduce emissions and
can add to an even stronger reduction of the EUA price by exogenously reducing the allowance
demand through channels identified in section 2.2, thus intensifying the problems of the EU ETS. At
the same time, given the differences in envisaged levels and timing of climate policy targets across
Member States, the question arises as to whether the EU ETS can be adjusted to help guide these
divergent national preferences towards mutually beneficial outcomes. These points are revisited in
the discussion of reform options in the next sections.

4. Reform options for the EU ETS
4.1.

Overview of reform options

As described in section 2.2, various factors may explain the current low price: (i) the economic crisis,
(ii) the inflow of international credits, (iii) the overlapping policies, and (iv) the low credibility of
commitment. Table 1 summarizes the categories of factors and the mechanisms which influence the
price. As discussed in the previous sections, whether the EU ETS needs reform, and the type of
reform warranted, depends on the factors that are considered to be the drivers of the low price.
Therefore, problems with different price drivers will need to be addressed for different reforms and
the third column of Table 1 categorizes the reform proposals currently under debate.

Factor
Economic crisis

Inflow of international
credits
Overlapping policies

Low credibility of
commitment

Mechanism
Reduced production by
companies within the EU ETS
leading to lower permit demand:
excess supply of permits
Higher than expected use of CDM
credits depresses demand for
permits.
Support for renewables leading
to displacement of CO2 emissions
within the EU ETS and through
this lower EUA demand and price
Demand for EUAs adjusted
downwards due to changes in
expectations/uncertainty

Possible reforms
Backloading, market stability
reserve, adjustment of target or
linear reduction factor, price collar
Restriction of offset use, options
addressing surplus (see quantityand price-based options above)
Improved coordination between
overlapping policies, sectoral
expansion, options addressing
surplus (see quantity- and pricebased options above)
Price collar, carbon authority

Table 1: Price formation process in the EU ETS and currently discussed reform proposals
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The generic reform options shown in Table 1 have been detailed in a number of scientific studies.
They can be broadly categorized as instruments addressing the price either directly (e.g. through a
price floor) or indirectly through the supply of permits, leading to more certainty on price or quantity.
In such a framework, various combinations of hybrid schemes exist. The other dimension of reform
is institutional and pertains to the degree of delegation that is embodied in a reform. Delegation is
understood as in a monetary policy context: the extent to which the governance of the carbon
market (in this case the supply of permits) is relinquished to a rule-based mechanism or an
independent body.
A rough classification of the different reform proposals in the two-dimensional space of
price/quantity certainty and degree of delegation is given in Figure 5. A variety of alternatives are
proposed in the literature, including rule-based permit supply adjustment based on economic and
energy indicators 32 or price triggers 33. An independent carbon authority is also put forward to adjust
a price corridor 34 or to ensure the compatibility of the cap with other climate and energy policies as
well as to monitor the import of carbon offsets 35. In common with central banks in monetary policy,
this authority would have a mandate enabling it to make adjustments in the supply of allowances
either through a rule or based on discretionary power 36.

37

Figure 5: Overview of different reform proposals. Soft PC: soft price corridor; Hard PC: hard price corridor . Source:
Grosjean et al. (2014).
32

IETA (2013)
Taschini et al. (2014)
34
Clò et al. (2013)
35
de Perthuis and Trotignon (2013)
36
U.S. Congress (2007)
37
A soft price collar refers to a trading scheme with an auction reserve price and an allowance reserve that can
be called upon when the price reaches a specified upper limit. A hard price collar represents a design with a
strict price floor and price ceiling.
33
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Within the existing debate, the European Commission proposed a set of six concrete reform options
in November 2012. These options, initially intended to prop up the price, can be broadly divided into
three sets (see Table 2) 38. Set I includes options aimed at a one-off reduction of permits. Set II
foresees an adjustment of the scope of the EU ETS through sectoral expansion or offset restrictions
and set III includes discretionary price management options.
EU Set I: Reduce permit
surplus

EU Set II: Adjust scope

EU Set III: Reduce Price
Uncertainty

•

•

•

•
•

Increase the EU
emissions reduction
target to 30% by 2020
Retire a number of
allowances in phase
three
Early revision of the
linear reduction factor

•

Expand the EU ETS to
other sectors
Restrict the number of
usable offsets

Discretionary price
management, e.g.:
 Price floor
 Soft price collar
(allowance reserve)

Table 2: Overview of reform options proposed by the EU Commission.

Set I entails a change of environmental ambition, or at least an adjustment of the current legislation
affecting the 2020 targets, and should increase current price levels to reflect an expected increase in
scarcity of allowances. Set II is likely to have an impact on the price but assessing its net impact
requires further investigation. Set III resembles classical hybrid structures with either a price floor or
an auction reserve price. In the case of the latter, unsold allowances would be placed in a reserve
that could be called upon in case of price hikes.
These reform proposals were discussed in a number of workshops and in stakeholder seminars
organized by the Commission. In January 2014, the European Commission finally proposed a reform
framework of the EU ETS along with broader climate policy targets for 2030. The proposal is a rulebased adjustment mechanism, called “Market Stability Reserve” (MSR), which regulates the permit
supply based on the size of the surplus of allowances in circulation in the market 39. The MSR will be
evaluated in detail in the next Section.
Along with the proposal of a Market Stability Reserve, the Commission also suggested a tightening of
the linear reduction factor (LRF) within the EU ETS sector. This is currently set at 1.74% up to 2020
and beyond (see section 2). The LRF is not part of the legal proposal and it is also not a structural
reform instrument; it mainly addresses the question of environmental ambition. The annual
reduction rate of 1.74%, which is currently agreed, is consistent with an overall reduction of about
73% by 2050. The Commission has proposed an LRF of 2.2% from 2020 onwards, leading to a
reduction of 87% by 2050 (relative to 2005) in the EU ETS sector. This is consistent with an 40%
overall reduction in GHG emissions by 2030 or 80% by 2050, according to their own calculations. In
our analysis of reform options, we take the LRF as given i.e. independent of the level that will be
applied after 2020. All reform options might, in principle, be implemented before 2020. However,
given the constraints and the time such a political process normally takes (even for minor changes) the backloading, for example, took around 20 months to be finalized - it is not realistic that a full38
39

Grosjean et al. (2014)
Similar to the IETA (2013) proposal
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fledged structural reform could be implemented much before 2020. Despite this, it is worth noting
that although the reform implementation will take several years and might be delayed to Phase IV
(2021-2030), market expectations and prices are likely to adjust in anticipation, factoring in expected
changes.
In the following, we will discuss the Commission’s proposal of a pure quantity-based instrument in
detail as it is currently the most important reform proposal already in the legislative procedure and
yet the mechanism is not very transparent. We evaluate whether the proposal addresses the lack of
dynamic efficiency within the current EU ETS.

4.2.

Evaluation of the Market Stability Reserve

The proposed Market Stability Reserve (MSR) is designed to adjust the short-term auction supply
without affecting the long-term cap by establishing a reserve of non-auctioned allowances. The MSR
is based on pre-defined rules on (i) when to feed allowances into the reserve and when to release
them (triggers), and (ii) how many allowances to reserve and how many to release (adjustment size).
When the total allowance surplus 40 is higher than 833 million allowances, 12% of the surplus is
removed from future auctions of the following year and placed in the reserve (i.e. at least 100
million allowances). If the total surplus is below 400 million allowances, 100 million allowances are
released from the reserve and added to future auctions. 100 million allowances will also be released
if, for more than six consecutive months, the allowance price is more than three times its average
price during the two preceding years (additional “safeguard” trigger). The reserve can be carried
over multiple periods, ensuring that the MSR is neutral to the overall cap.
The first key design aspect of the MSR is the focus on a quantity-based trigger based on the size of
the cumulative allowance surplus (see also Figure 6). The aim is to maintain the total surplus within
the pre-defined target range of 400 and 833 million allowances. The second key design aspect is the
asymmetric adjustment size. While the release of allowances is limited to 100 million allowances, the
withdrawal can be much higher depending on the size of the total surplus (e.g., 240 million
allowances for the current surplus of 2,000 million). The asymmetry reflects the EC’s aim to remove
the surplus of allowances that has built up without releasing them too quickly.
These design features also reflect the underlying concerns and objectives of the European
Commission which are outlined in the Impact Assessment of the MSR 41. The problem definition
focuses mainly on “market imbalances” caused by the rigid auction supply. The main concern is that
the resulting large “structural surplus” negatively affects the long-term cost-effectiveness of the EU
ETS in the short-term and beyond. Thus the increasingly high allowance surplus, rather than the
persistently low allowance price, is identified as the main problem. To restore the functioning of the
EU ETS, it is assumed that reducing the surplus to a certain band level will restore the “signal” that
guides low-carbon investments 42. The signal is most likely influenced by the allowance price because
in an ETS it is the price that incentivizes dynamically efficient investment. In this sense, it is implicitly
40

The total allowance surplus, or more specifically the "total number of allowances in circulation", is defined
as the difference between all allowances issued plus international credits used since 2008 up to the end of
each year, and verified emissions recorded since 2008 plus allowances in the reserve at the end of that same
year.
41
European Commission (2014c)
42
“A large surplus hence strongly confounds the signal for investments, which are necessary for the transition
towards a low-carbon economy, including energy supply.” European Commission (2014e)
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Figure 6: Stylized representation of projected allowances in circulation: the MSR triggering mechanism. The figure shows
a stylized representation of projected allowances in circulation (size of the cumulative allowance surplus) that serves as
the basis for intervention conditional on two quantity-based triggers (red and green line). Source: Trotignon et al. (2014).

assumed that a surplus size in the range of 400 - 833 million allows market prices to remain
undisturbed. Some argue that such a surplus level may be justified by the needs of regulated entities
to hedge their forward sales of electricity. Thus, the MSR can be considered as an instrument to
(temporarily) reduce the volume of unused allowances in situations where the allowance surplus
grows beyond the hedging demand. However, if the volume within the MSR, set between 400 and
833 million allowances over the period to 2030, should decline with total emissions over time, then
the hedging demand will also decline. It is also problematic that there could be a significant time lag
before any intervention occurs. This is because the trigger is based on an indicator – i.e. the total
surplus – for which timely data is not available. It can only be calculated based on data (for verified
emissions and surrendered allowances/credits) relating to the situation two years previously. This
inflexibility sheds doubts on the ability of the MSR to encourage supply flexibility in the EU ETS.
Moreover, it remains unclear whether the surplus band of 400 – 833 million allowances in the MSR
was actually informed by hedging demand estimates. Indeed, the European Commission only states
that “the upper and lower boundaries of the range were determined following consultations with
stakeholders and reflect a range where experience shows that the market was able to operate in an
orderly manner” 43. Thus, the exact rationale behind the triggers is opaque. That may be exactly
because getting the quantities “right” seems impossible given (i) the diverging views on the order of
magnitude required, (ii) the way that hedging will evolve over time, (iii) the risk posed by strategic
reporting of companies about their hedging behavior, and (iv) the limited possibilities of verifying
the data. As a result, the European Commission seems to have adopted a trial and error approach
with respect to the choice of quantity triggers since they are due to be revised by 2026 at the latest
in order to correct potential failures in their setting. The expected revision may herald a continuous
adjustment phase of the EU ETS (with unforeseeable consequences) for the next decade, which is
unlikely to contribute to stabilizing the expectations of market participants. In particular, experience
has shown that a revision of EU ETS legislation is a complex process characterized by high
transaction costs and large regulatory uncertainty.
43

European Commission (2014f)
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In addition, it is questionable whether the central assumption of the MSR – that a temporary
reduction of the allowance surplus will cure the price decline – is justified. In fact, even the
Commission’s impact assessment acknowledges that the price impact of the MSR cannot be
anticipated44. This is precisely because the MSR only changes the timing of auctioning - in this sense
constituting a long-term backloading proposal - and as such does not provide a clear price signal.
When the reserve builds up, the number of allowances accessible to market participants at auctions
in the short-term will decrease. However, the allowances are supposed to come back to market
auctions in the mid to long-term.
According to standard economic theory, such a cap neutral adjustment of the auction timing should
have a minimal or zero impact on the allowance price due to inter-temporal price smoothing. In fact
the MSR may have some effect if the quantity of allowances withheld in the reserve is sufficiently
large to ensure that companies with an allowance shortage (e.g. the power sector) cannot meet
their compliance needs by buying them in auctions. Only then might short-term prices increase to a
level that motivates surplus owners (e.g. industry) to sell allowances. However, rebound effects
would occur when the allowances return to the market, resulting in depressed prices in the mid to
long-term. Ex ante, the extent to which market participants will anticipate the inter-temporal impact
of the reserve and adapt their behavior is uncertain. Moreover, the allowance price evolution should
depend on whether market participants expect the allowances to be returned to the market as
currently proposed. As a matter of fact, it is possible that a number of allowances could be
permanently retired after a certain period of time, or if the reserve exceeds a certain size. Such a
hypothetical adjustment would no longer be cap-neutral and should drive up the price.
According to inter-temporal pricing theory the interplay between the magnitude of the allowance
surplus and the allowance price formation seems incomprehensible. The picture might be slightly
different however, if market failures prevent the occurrence of inter-temporal price smoothing. For
instance, once the surplus in the market exceeds the hedging demand from power producers,
speculative investors may be needed to provide balance. Yet, speculators may require high rates of
return, and can only secure such returns if the allowance prices are highly discounted relative to
expected future prices. In such a setting, with hedge market failure and suboptimal discounting, a
reduction of the allowance surplus by means of the MSR could be adequate to stabilize the
allowance price 45. However, it remains to be empirically determined whether discount rates of
future prices increase de facto with increasing surpluses. The current implied interest rate of the
EUA futures curve indeed suggests that discount rates decrease when the surplus builds up 46.
In summary, from a theoretical perspective, the central assumptions of the MSR on the allowance
surplus are not upheld; an allowance price link is incompatible with inter-temporal price formation
in a dynamic ETS incorporating banking, unless market failures prevent price smoothing. Given the
weak impact on the price signal, the MSR should also have a very uncertain impact on investment in
R&D as well as on low-carbon investments. In a similar vein, several public statements on the MSR
also reflect the difficulties of stakeholders in anticipating the impacts of the mechanism. These have

44

European Commission (2014c)
Schopp and Neuhoff (2013)
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Based on futures price data for (i) the nearest contract and (ii) eight December contracts with expiration in
Phase III (2013-2020) obtained from ICE Futures Europe (www.theice.com).
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been labeled as “paper-tiger” and “backloading-de-luxe” amongst others. 47 Most strikingly, several
market participants (e.g., BDEW, OPG, IETA) call for additional clarification on the mechanism’s
effect, corroborating the above conclusion. In view of these major uncertainties, it is unlikely that
the MSR can cure the problem caused by a lack of dynamic efficiency and prevent a lock-in into
carbon intensive technologies. It also does not address the problem of overlapping policy
instruments at Member State level. A broader reform is therefore required.

5. A comprehensive reform of the EU ETS
In Section 3 we have identified the major problems of the current EU ETS in terms of costeffectiveness and the related problem of additional unilateral policy instruments at Member State
level. In Section 4.2 we have argued that the proposed MSR will not address and cure these
problems. Therefore, instead of a narrow reform of the EU ETS, a comprehensive reform addressing
several aspects of carbon pricing is required. This includes (i) setting a price collar within the EU ETS,
(ii) expanding the EU ETS to other sectors (e.g. transport, heat) (iii) addressing additional market
failures by policy instruments in addition to carbon pricing and (iv) addressing the possible problem
of carbon leakage by expanding the group of countries that participate in the EU ETS or by linking it
to other regions.

5.1.

Setting a price collar

While the MSR is a purely quantity-based instrument that indirectly aims to stabilize the allowance
price, setting a price collar directly addresses price certainty. A price collar is a two-sided price
instrument that combines a price floor (minimum price) with a price ceiling (maximum price). Within
the auctioning system of the EU ETS it is possible to implement a minimum price as an auction
reserve price. This means that the allowances in the auction are only released when the auction
price is beyond a pre-defined minimum price. A price ceiling could be implemented by releasing
additional emission allowances for auctions from a reserve if the auction price hits a specified
maximum price 48. This design has already been implemented successfully in the US Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative.
In general, implementing a price collar in the EU ETS would generate three different potential
outcomes: (i) when allowance demand is low, the price is set close to the floor level, and emissions
are below the annual cap; (ii) when demand is moderate, the price is somewhere between the floor
and ceiling, and the emissions are determined by the cap; and (iii) when demand is high, the price is
set at the ceiling, and emissions are above the cap. Thus, the hybrid price-quantity mechanism
reduces the price uncertainty arising on the demand side, e.g. due to uncertain future GDP growth
or future technological development. Accordingly, this mechanism represents a compromise
between concerns about environmental outcomes (cap on emissions) and concerns about cost
uncertainty (allowance price volatility) 49. Moreover, it would address the industry’s concern of prices
that are so high that they might threaten EU competitiveness. However, while it directly addresses
the problem of the weak price signal, it does not solve the underlying problem of lacking long-term
credibility.
47
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This section outlines the two main advantages of a price collar: first, and in contrast to the MSR, it
directly addresses dynamic efficiency. Specifically, it can deliver a stable and sufficiently high
allowance price and address the crucial question of how to manage expectations of long-term prices.
Second, it can facilitate the environmental effectiveness of unilateral climate policy measures (e.g.
renewable supporting schemes) in the EU Member States with heterogeneous costs and preferences,
as long as the price operates at the floor level.

5.1.1. Addressing the problem of dynamic efficiency
As outline above (see Section 3.2), the concern about the dynamic efficiency of the EU ETS is largely
underpinned by (i) the current low EUA price and (ii) the significant supply and demand uncertainty,
which can distort optimal private sector decisions over mitigation, investment, and R&D. Setting a
price floor is probably the clearest way to correct the current low price signal and achieve EUA prices
that are high enough to drive dynamically efficient investment. In fact, the implementation of a price
floor via an auction reserve price would immediately increase the current price of allowances (even
if the price corridor is not introduced before the next trading phase in 2021). This inter-temporal
price effect is due to the fact that market participants would anticipate the future scarcity created by
the unsold allowances held back from auctions below the reserve price 50. If the implemented price
floor was also credible, the introduction would immediately impact company investment decisions.
In combination with the price ceiling, the specified price corridor truncates the possible range of EUA
prices in times of low and high demand and, hence reduces the significant uncertainties on the
demand side. The increased allowance price certainty could help overcome the investment backlog
arising from ‘too much’ uncertainty. By reducing demand-side uncertainties, on top of implementing
a sufficiently high EUA price, a price collar may incentivize the investment in the innovations that are
required for cost-effective long-term decarbonization. While the floor price is justified in terms of
cost-effectiveness, the argument for a price ceiling is different. It is needed because prices can also
increase substantially through shocks. When a ceiling is set, this risk is reduced symmetrically, which
is important for investors, as for them both directions of the risk (prices that are substantially higher
or lower) are important. So setting a price collar gives a level of confidence. In addition, a price
ceiling prevents costs becoming politically infeasible. However, it is worth noting that uncertainties
regarding the supply side of allowances (e.g. future changes in the cap), in particular with regard to
credibility problems of long-term commitments, still exist in an ETS with a price collar (see below).
In addition to delivering a stable and sufficiently high allowance price, a price collar addresses the
important question of how to manage expectations for long-term prices. It has been shown that in
order to achieve dynamic efficiency, current prices should reflect (discounted) long-term price
expectations. An ETS with banking can achieve that result if market participants have sufficient
foresight and capacity to form rational expectations about the longer term 51, and if they do not
significantly discount future prices and quantities due to uncertainty in supply and demand.
However, it is not clear whether the requirement for rational expectations in the EU ETS, as well as
discounting in line with social preferences, is ensured in practice. Indeed, in the absence of the
necessary foresight, the price collar is a useful way for the European Commission to signal the
50

By contrast, if the floor price was implemented through the payment of a minimum tax (while maintaining
the allowance release) a full price drop of EUAs between now and 2020 would probably result, since the
oversupply would become permanent and thus their scarcity value zero.
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socially desired levels of current and future prices in line with the long-term cap of the EU ETS. This
can further induce incentives to invest in low-carbon technologies and avoid a lock-in into a carbon
intensive infrastructure, e.g. in power capacities and grid.
However, the latter hinges heavily on the question of whether the price signal is credible because
the price collar is set within the political sphere and can be revised and even overhauled over time.
In fact, policy revision is necessary, precisely because a fundamental feature of climate change is
uncertainty about its impacts. In particular, as new information about the benefits, costs and global
commitment arise, expectations about long-term emission levels and prices will evolve and this
makes revisions to the EU ETS policies essential 52. Transparent and orderly policy revisions can
minimize credibility problems to provide an institutional setting that secures long-term credibility 53.
Besides the legislative procedure already available, some propose the creation of an independent
authority with a degree of discretionary power to make adjustments, see Section 4.1. Various
designs for an independent carbon authority have been put forward in the literature 54 with the hope
of giving the process credibility, in a similar vein to delegation in monetary policy. An independent
group of experts, protected by long-term mandates, would be in charge of reacting to new
information and making sure that the signal sent by the EU ETS is consistent with the long-term
goals of climate policy. While such an institutional design is appealing, the major challenges would
be defining the exact mandate of such an institution and preserving its democratic legitimacy. It
should also be noted that the question of the institutional design is not specific to the option of
setting a price collar, but is a question for every reform option, as outlined in Section 4.1.

5.1.2. Addressing the problem of unilateral policies at Member State
level
The second – and so far often overlooked – advantage relates to the aspect of environmental
federalism and the concern that Member States (MS), due to their diverse preferences towards the
technology mix and level and timing of climate policy targets, might increasingly implement
domestic policy instruments that impact the objectives of the EU ETS55. Under the current, purely
quantity-based EU ETS, any effort to reduce emissions by one MS does not affect the overall level of
emissions. In other words, the adoption of any unilateral measure is not environmentally effective 56.
For instance, assuming that there are no additional market failures, a renewable supporting scheme
for electricity at the Member State level does not lead to any additional abatement – it only leads to
a lower EUA price 57. This situation becomes even worse if the resulting low allowance price
motivates the MS with more ambitious domestic mitigation goals to implement further unilateral
measures, which would further exacerbate the problem of falling allowance prices. By contrast, an
EU ETS with a price floor would allow Member States to adopt their own policies and, most
importantly, the unilateral measures could actually contribute to an overall emissions reduction at
the EU level. More specifically, if the EU ETS operated a floor price, every national tax, renewable
52
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supporting scheme or efficiency standard would lead to additional abatement, i.e. the unilateral
policies would be environmentally effective. During times in which national policies are in a phase of
revival (e.g. the carbon floor price in the UK) 58 it is of vital importance for the EU ETS as a European
instrument, to take this into consideration. An auction reserve price could therefore address both
the politically economic constraints of the multi-level government and the overlapping of EU and MS
policy instruments. It would allow national preferences to be addressed, for example those with high
ambitions for mitigation, without undermining the environmental effectiveness of such additional
policies. The floor price would guarantee that a stable and sufficiently high allowance price is
delivered. However, evidence suggests that national emissions reduction measures, such as the
deployment of renewables, have a higher marginal abatement cost than those induced by the EU
ETS. In other words the unilateral measures are not (statically) cost effective 59. Also, it is clear that
the environmental effectiveness argument only holds when the EU ETS operates at the floor price. If
the allowance price is above the floor, national policies lead to an allowance price reduction without
additional abatement. Moreover, it is important to note that a floor price implemented at the
national level, such as in the UK, would not be an environmentally effective way to reduce
emissions 60. Only an EU-wide minimum price would have an effect on emissions.
There are certainly some challenges in introducing a price collar. The first problem is to determine
the “right” dynamic EUA price collar. As discussed above (Section 3.2), economy-energy models
provide integrated and systemic views on socially desired CO2 price levels. Specifically, these models
enable the required CO2 price paths to be determined to achieve a given cumulative cap at least cost.
Based on different key parameter assumptions about – such as GDP growth, energy efficiency
improvements, renewables and fossil cost developments – model comparisons can deliver optimal
price ranges for a given cumulative cap. This price range could then guide decisions on the price
collar. For instance, the recent EMF28 comparison exercise shows a minimum price of 20€ / tCO2
across models for scenarios after 2021 (see Figure 4). Existing economy-energy models could
certainly be extended and dedicated to determining a dynamic price collar. In addition, current
estimates for the social cost of carbon (SCC) can be useful in determining a price corridor. The SCC is
a standard indicator for the economic damages associated with climate change; it reflects the
present monetary value of damage that would be avoided by a marginal reduction in CO2 emissions.
Most recent analyses suggest that the expected global cost of one ton of CO2 emitted in 2020 is
between $12 and $64 (with $43 as the central value) 61. It should be noted that the models used to
estimate the SCC, known as integrated assessment models, probably understate future damages.
The greatest problem however, might be political feasibility and the multi-level governance
character of the EU ETS; it is likely that a price floor, even if it is implemented as an auction reserve
price, will be interpreted as an (EU) tax. Taxes however, as all fiscal measures, are subject to the
unanimity rule of the EU and it seems to be difficult to get an agreement of all 28 Member States on
an adequate price level. In this context, the lesson learned from the Californian ETS is that an
auction reserve price does not necessarily constitute a tax in the legal sense. Instead, it was
considered to be a fee not subject to supermajority requirement. Another disadvantage concerns
58
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environmental effectiveness. If prices hit the ceiling, and the price cap is applied, then fewer
emissions would be reduced in the ETS sector than desired and more emission reductions would
have to be delivered by sectors outside the ETS. Investing in offset projects to compensate for the
increase of emissions could be one way to overcome this problem 62. Revenues from EUA auctioning
could be used to finance these offset projects (see Section 5.3). The second way to address this
problem is the adoption a soft price corridor instead of a hard corridor. With a hard price collar, an
unlimited number of additional allowances would be introduced if the allowance price hit the price
ceiling. In such a situation it could become impossible to meet the emission reduction target of the
EU ETS. In contrast, a soft price collar places an upper limit on the number of additional allowances
in a given period when the price ceiling is hit. In this case, emissions cannot exceed the cap plus the
allowance reserve. Thus, a soft price collar implies more quantity certainty than a hard price corridor.
However, with a soft price collar the price ceiling will only be maintained as long as additional
allowances are available in a reserve.

5.2.

Expanding sectoral coverage

The EU ETS currently encompasses 45% of total EU GHG emissions. It covers the electricity sector,
parts of the industry sector, and EU-internal aviation. In order to achieve long-term decarbonization
targets, substantial emission reductions are also required in the other sectors, i.e. road transport,
buildings and agriculture. The most cost-effective way to achieve reductions across all these sectors
would be to equalize the sector marginal abatement costs. Establishing asymmetric sectoral GHG
prices risks compromising cost-effectiveness by potentially generating very different levels of climate
policy ambition across the sectors (different explicit and implicit marginal carbon prices). However,
if the carbon price is to be uniform across all sectors, it has to be nuanced.
First, emission standards complementing carbon pricing can be justified because there are other
market failures in the different sectors. Some studies have shown that emission standards are able
to overcome the behavior “failures” of energy saving potentials 63, such as lack of and asymmetry of
information, principal-agent problems, split incentives, hidden costs or bounded rationality.
However, while the current regulatory standards can help address market failures such as split
incentives between landlords and tenants or informational transaction costs in vehicle purchase
decisions, these standards fail to incentivize all available abatement options, e.g. demand-side
abatement options that would result from increasing the price of GHG emissions.
Second, another strand of literature has analyzed emissions standards as a temporary substitute for
carbon pricing, when reliable carbon prices are not feasible due to short-term distributional
consequences 64. Emission standards for newly installed capacities protect owners of existing capital
stocks from the depreciation of their assets and the under-utilization of their capital stock. In this
way, efficiency standards can potentially reduce short-term costs (and increase the long-term costs)
making the introduction of mitigation and the implementation of a carbon price politically more
feasible. Despite the advantage of emission standards as a temporary substitute for carbon pricing,
carbon pricing remains crucial in the long-term because of the rebound effect. Standards also risk
causing a lock-in into fossil-fuel infrastructure without incentivizing investments into low-carbon
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technologies 65. A basic drawback of climate policies based on standards is that they do not generate
all of the available mitigation options.
A third reason arguing against a comprehensive coverage is that pre-existing regulation,
distortionary taxes and subsidies are not perceived as removable in the short-run. Standards
currently form the main policy instruments achieving emission reductions in the road transport and
building sectors (e.g. EU vehicle CO2-intensity standards at the EU-level, building codes at the
national level). In addition, in the transport sector for example, different tax burdens applied for
budgetary reasons or for internalizing factors other than the climate externality, currently lead to
implicit carbon taxes between 130 € / tCO2 (Spain) and 230 € / tCO2 (Greece) 66. Including all existing
sectors in the EU ETS would therefore lead to different tax burdens across the sectors. In addition,
specific dynamics in each sector might have to be considered; these would include inertia, risk
aversion and discount rates of consumers or producers, the need for new technology deployment or
demand elasticities. So, a dual price system, with an ETS for large industries and a carbon tax for
diffuse emissions in the heat sector or road transport, might generate the best results in terms of
incentivising investments in low carbon technologies, without overburdening industry. At least this
could be a pragmatic step, which would not lose sight of the long-term perspective of a uniform
carbon price and a full sectoral coverage of the EU ETS. In this context, it is important to note that
the sectoral expansion is not meant to be an instrument for stabilizing short-term EUA prices, but it
is meant to complement the price collar in order to achieve the decarbonisation in a cost-effective
way.

5.3.

Revenue recycling

In general, the carbon price interacts with the tax system 67. It is an implicit tax on factors of
production which can exacerbate distortions from pre-existing taxes. In addition, carbon pricing
generates a new revenue stream for governments. The income stream of revenues can in principle
be used for different purposes, e.g. reducing the burden from other taxes. Smart revenue recycling
policies can potentially reduce net policy costs (double dividend) and improve the acceptance and
the effectiveness of carbon pricing. GHG pricing policies generate government revenues in a cap and
trade system, if allowances are auctioned, and in GHG tax systems.
Currently, within the EU ETS, about 40% of allowances are auctioned, while the larger proportion of
allowances is still issued at no cost. About 70% of all allowances will be auctioned up until the year
2020, when the transitional free allocation to some sectors in a few countries will be phased out. 88%
of all auctioning revenues are distributed back to the Member States according to the
grandfathering principle based on their proportional emissions in the period 2005-2007 (taking
whichever year in which emissions were highest), while 12% of auctioning revenues are returned
primarily to the least wealthy countries, i.e. the new Member States. The EU directive on the EU ETS
recommends spending at least 50% of the auction revenues on mitigation and adaptation. This is
only followed by some Member States; some incorporate it directly into the general budget (25%)
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and for some the use is simply unknown (41%) 68. Altogether a revenue stream of 3.55 bn€ was
generated in 2013.
A higher proportion of auctioning would allow Member States to raise more revenues for different
purposes. A simple thought experiment gives an idea of the order of magnitude of revenues from an
ETS with a broader sectoral coverage and increased auctioning; introducing a rising price collar with
minimum price of 20€, expanding EU ETS sector coverage to 90% and increasing the auctioning
shares to 80% would ceteris paribus yield total EU revenues of about 64bn€. This is a factor of 18
above the revenue in 2013.
These revenues could be used to lower labor and capital taxes, thus reducing net policy costs and
potentially compensating for increased energy costs of households (e.g. by preferentially lowering
income taxes or increasing social benefits for poorer households). Another option is to forego
auction revenue value and lower policy costs of industries threatened by competiveness concerns by
allowing inframarginal exemptions 69. Lowering costs to particular industries can, under a cap and
trade system, be achieved by free allocation of allowances for a certain fraction of company
emissions, and by inframarginal tax exemptions under a carbon tax. In both systems public revenues
are foregone to effectively finance specific exemptions for industry. This underlines that the aspect
of revenue recycling and its proper use is of vital importance for the acceptance and political
feasibility of pricing carbon.

5.4.

Stimulating innovation: policy instruments in addition to carbon
pricing

Innovation is crucial for developing the required low carbon technologies. To trigger innovation,
dynamically efficient carbon prices are needed. As we argued above, it is difficult to establish
dynamic efficiency within a cap and trade system. A price floor, as a hybrid instrument, could solve
this problem because it establishes a long-term credible price signal.
Even a reliable price signal might not be enough to stimulate innovation. This is because there are
market failures in the innovation and diffusion of technologies, besides that of the climate
externality, that provide a strong rationale for policies that foster the development and adoption of
low-carbon technologies 70 . The main market failure associated with innovation is knowledge
spillover, i.e. firms cannot receive full benefit from their innovations. The main market failures
associated with adoption are learning and network externalities. Moreover, both stages are also
characterized by market failures related to incomplete information.
There are different policies to address the market failures specific to both stages. R&D policies
support technological development until the technologies are ready for commercialization71. As
empirical evidence for innovation spillovers is very high and as knowledge market failures are higher
in clean technologies 72, there is substantial agreement among economists that R&D polices should
be part of the portfolio of policy instruments. In general, several instruments exist to support R&D
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including subsidies to private R&D, strengthened patent rules, and technology prizes. It is important
to note that different policy instruments become relevant at different stages of the innovation
process 73. However, as the outcome of innovation processes, i.e. market success, cannot be
anticipated in advance, and the exact effects of innovation policy are unknown, policy learning
requires some experimentation and a large variety of policies.
Support during the adoption and diffusion stage is accomplished by deployment policies which
create a market pull for certain technologies. Typical instruments used to support, for example,
renewable energy sources are feed-in tariffs or renewable portfolio standards. Whether such
policies are warranted is a controversial issue, mainly because solid empirical evidence is lacking and
the seriousness of the underlying market failures cannot be determined 74. Proponents, however,
argue that the potential positive technological externalities are sufficient to ensure respective policy
efforts are maintained. Moreover, historical experience with technological transformations in other
sectors, suggests that the use of deployment policies will be needed75.
A comparison of the social return on investments of R&D policies with that of deployment policies
would be necessary for the design of these policies. Unfortunately, empirical evidence is limited.
Public support for R&D in new climate friendly technologies, incentives for market development of
ripe technologies and stable long-term market conditions that guarantee investor security are all
important aspects for innovation. In those areas where spending on deployment measures has
exceeded public R&D investments (such as wind and PV), the market should be strengthened and
public support schemes should be gradually cut back when technologies become competitive. The
newly available resources may then be used to expand research in areas where more research is still
needed, such as storage, grids or (smart) demand-side options. In these areas it seems reasonable to
reallocate government investment flows from deployment to R&D.
Innovation policy encompasses science and technology policy and goes beyond mere support of
R&D. Policy instruments target various stages of the innovation process ranging from supporting
basic science to market deployment. The choice of the most suitable policy instrument depends on
the maturity of the technology.
It is important to bear in mind that successful innovation policy needs to allow private businesses to
exploit market opportunities. Therefore, setting standards, market development, and legal
framework conditions are as important as financial R&D support. Private actors are able to mobilize
considerably higher R&D budgets than public bodies, which is underlined by the differences in
business vs. government expenditures on R&D. It may well be argued that innovation efforts by
private companies are hindered because of a non-existent commonly agreed long-term framework
for European energy and climate policies.
Innovation energy policy should focus on strengthening the overall performance of the innovation
chain and capacity of its stakeholders for innovation. While the definition of climate targets and
research agendas by EU institutions certainly contributes to streamlining otherwise dispersed

73

IRENA (2013)
Aldy et al. (2010)
75
Jaffe (2012)
74

25

research efforts, systemic policies geared towards strengthening the overall performance of
innovation systems are hardly ever to be found.

5.5.

Addressing carbon leakage

A long-standing issue in the debate on unilateral climate policies is the concern that some fraction of
the emission reductions achieved might be offset by increasing emissions in regions with no – or less
ambitious – climate policies 76. Addressing carbon leakage is important for political feasibility because
if the burden for the home industry is perceived to be too high, a reform of the EU ETS will not be
agreed upon. In addition, if emissions are outsourced to other world regions, it questions the
environmental effectiveness of the instrument.
Depending on a large array of assumptions, including the desired stabilization goal and how
industrial structure and international trade are modeled, the literature finds a broad spectrum of
leakage rates in the regions subject to binding emission targets (i.e. the fraction of unilateral
emission reductions offset by leakage) 77. For instance, a recent comparison of 12 computable
general equilibrium models finds leakage rates between 5% and 19%, with a mean value of 12% 78.
For the scenarios assuming unilateral action by the EU to cut emissions by 20% and 30% below years
2004 and 2020 respectively, the study finds respective leakage rates of 15% and 21%. More recently,
several contributions have indicated that leakage rates could become negative, i.e. more abatement
in the EU would also reduce emissions in other countries. This may arise either from fuel switching
within energy markets 79, through technology diffusion to non-abating countries, or from crowding
out of capital accumulation in third party countries as a result of rising capital demand in countries
engaging in abatement 80. In addition, it has been demonstrated that technology spill-overs to nonabating countries can significantly reduce leakage rates 81.
One robust insight that emerges from the literature is that leakage rates are lower where
participation in international mitigation efforts is broader 82. For this reason, harmonizing carbon
prices via policy coordination, or even linking the EU ETS with other emerging emission trading
systems could ‘level the playing field’ 83; carbon leakage with regards to trade with these regions
could be eliminated or alleviated when all or some sectors are covered by the EU ETS. When linking
such systems without full coverage, the overall effects on leakage are ambiguous and depend on the
sectors covered in the system with which the EU ETS is to be linked 84. This is because linking not only
eliminates one economic distortion (different carbon prices between the capped sectors), but also
increases another (the difference in carbon prices between the capped and the uncapped sectors in
one region). Hence it is necessary to carefully analyze the effects of linking on carbon leakage.
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Free allocation of emission permits is another way to reduce carbon leakage. This can be achieved by
‘grandfathering’ (i.e. allocation of emission permits in proportion to past emissions 85), which
provides an incentive to remain in business for firms that are subject to a carbon price if their
potential losses are covered by the value of free emission permits 86. As demonstrated in a study for
the US 87, giving away 13% of emission permits to energy-intensive industries would be sufficient to
maintain their profits, and it seems reasonable to assume that for the EU a roughly similar figure
would apply. In addition, if future emission permits are assigned by grandfathering, using today’s
emissions as a basis, companies will have fewer incentives to reduce their production in order to
receive more of these permits at a later date 88, such that there is less incentive to increase imports
in these sectors and carbon leakage is reduced 89. However, this also means that more abatement
has to be performed in other sectors, where it may come at a higher cost, thus increasing total
mitigation costs. Output-based rebates (OBRs) that give emission permits to companies free of
charge in proportion to their output relative to an industry- or sector-specific benchmark on
emission-intensity (i.e. emissions per unit or per monetary value), are an alternative to
grandfathering. As OBRs only incentivize a switch to cleaner technologies, rather than a reduction in
production or consumption, the price signal for emission-intensive products is not fully passed
through to final consumers. This raises the economic costs of achieving a certain level of emission
reductions above those of grandfathering 90. As a consequence, no unambiguous conclusion can be
drawn regarding the preferred policy in terms of welfare (including issues such as consumption
losses, distributional consequences and employment effects) or reducing leakage. Rather, the total
effect of both policies depends on the interplay between creating additional domestic emissions and
avoiding emissions abroad 91.
Finally, tailor-made trade policies are an appropriate means of addressing leakage. In this context, it
should be noted that the popular concept of full ‘border tax adjustment’ (BTA) which would subject
imports from regions with less ambitious climate polices to a price on ‘embedded emissions’ equal
to the one prevailing in the EU ETS, does not constitute an optimal policy and can even increase
carbon leakage 92. This is due to the fact that faced with tariffs, the EU’s trade partners would
readjust their production structure towards goods for the domestic market instead of exports; it
might well be the case that the former are more carbon-intensive than the latter, which would then
cause emissions to increase. Furthermore, full BTA would be subject to considerable uncertainty and
imply substantial costs to determine the carbon content of imports at a product level. As carbon
leakage predominantly concerns energy-intensive and heavily traded products, a scheme that
focuses on a few key sectors could substantially reduce leakage. For instance, one study determined
that the application of EU border taxes on imports of steel, aluminum, and cement would reduce
leakage in these sectors to practically zero 93. In order to decrease complexity and alleviate concerns
related to discriminatory treatment, carbon contents could be calculated on the ‘best available
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technology approach’ which assumes that trade partners use production technologies comparable
to the EU 94. As a mechanism to make such an arrangement politically feasible, the EU should
negotiate agreements with its main trading partners in which the latter agree to levy taxes on their
most carbon-intensive exports 95. This would have the identical effect on carbon leakage as import
tariffs, but would permit the exporting countries to retain the associated tax revenues. An
interesting example of such an approach are the voluntary export restraints put into place by Japan
to protect the US car industry in the 1980s. That taxation of energy-intensive exports is feasible is
shown by China, which already has such an export tariff in place (allegedly to reduce domestic
energy consumption) 96.

Figure 7: The emergence of global carbon markets. The biggest emitters can make the biggest difference. Source: World
Bank (2013).

However, certainly the best way to tackle carbon leakage and the most efficient way to reduce
global emissions is for the number of countries that apply carbon trading schemes, or that
implement a carbon tax, to increase. Carbon markets are already being established worldwide (see
Figure 7). The new World Bank Report on “States and trends of carbon pricing” concludes that a
growing number of countries and regions are putting a price on carbon and that “together these
carbon pricing instruments cover almost 6 GtCO2e or about 12% of the annual global GHG
emissions” 97. It is obvious, however, that this coalition must grow substantially in order to effectively
address climate change . So far the effect of carbon leakage has been rather small, but for the future
there is the danger that without stronger international endeavor, Europe’s aspirations will get stuck
in a cul-de-sac, contributing little to emission reductions but compromising European
competitiveness. In this respect a price collar might be a good instrument when taking the linking
and the compatibility to other emission trading systems into account. One proposal for the
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international negotiations, for example, suggests 98 that all major economies should signal a floor
price in addition to an emission target to prevent targets from being unexpectedly lax. Introducing
minimum GHG prices worldwide would probably be the best way to address carbon leakage.

6. Conclusions
This paper presents and reflects the discussion surrounding the current performance of the EU ETS
and specifically the persistently low price of EUAs. It analyses the performance of the EU ETS in
terms of environmental effectiveness and cost-effectiveness, and examines the reform options
additionally in terms of political feasibility. Our analysis concludes that the environmental
effectiveness of the EU ETS is given (in fact the emission target has been overachieved), but that the
EU ETS lacks dynamic efficiency. The EU Commission has suggested addressing this problem by
introducing a reform that manipulates the supply of EUAs, i.e. the Market Stability Reserve. However,
we show that this reform proposal does not address the problem of dynamic efficiency, mainly
because the interplay between the magnitude of the EUA surplus and the EUA price formation
seems incomprehensible from an inter-temporal perspective. It also fails to address the problem of
overlapping policies arising from the existence of supplementary policy instruments at the Member
State level that could undermine the overall performance of the EU ETS. By contrast, our analysis
clearly shows that instead of a narrow reform of the EU ETS focusing on the EUA surplus, a
comprehensive reform addressing a series of aspects of carbon pricing is required. This includes (i)
setting a price collar within the EU ETS, (ii) expanding the EU ETS to other sectors (e.g. transport,
buildings) (iii) addressing additional market failures through policy instruments in addition to carbon
pricing and (iv) addressing the possible problem of carbon leakage by expanding the group of
countries that adopt comparable GHG prices.
Evaluating the reform proposals of the EU ETS currently being discussed, it is important to
understand how prices are formed In particular in a situation with non-binding annual caps, it is
unclear how price formation works. In theory and in a situation not characterized by a temporarily
non-binding cap, abatement-related fundamentals affect the price through the demand side (e.g.
support for renewables raises their deployment and thus decreases the demand for EUAs). Political
decisions have an impact on the price through the supply side (e.g. by adapting the cap).
Latest research indeed shows that in a regime with temporarily non-binding annual caps, the
abatement-related fundamentals working through the demand side are generally only able to
explain a minor share of the observed price decline in the EU ETS. One explanation is that market
participants do not seem to believe in the (long-term) cap announced by policymakers. The lack of
credibility thus results in further downward pressure on the EUA price and very likely impedes costeffective investment by failing to provide the incentive to innovate and deploy clean technologies.
The widely-held view is that the cumulative surplus of EUAs in the EU ETS needs to be addressed.
This is the reason why the EU Commission has proposed the MSR. However, the outcomes of the
workshop and our analysis identify the stabilization of price expectations as the main problem. The
MSR is not able to address this problem. It is also unlikely that the MSR can cure the problem of a
lack of dynamic efficiency and prevent a lock-in into a carbon intensive infrastructure. This is
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because the MSR is a quantity-based and cap-neutral set aside that only changes the timing of
auctioning - in this sense constituting a long-term backloading proposal - and as such does not
provide a clear price signal. Instead, we propose to set a price collar with an upper and lower level
for the EUA price, which would be the ideal policy instrument to judge cost-effectiveness criteria. It
would help to reduce uncertainty over supply and demand now and in the future and thus stabilize
expectations. This could address market failure in the sense that in a political market like the EU ETS,
the future is much more exposed to uncertainties and regulatory changes, with potentially
tremendous impacts, than in other markets. The ability of an EU ETS with a price collar to achieve
environmental effectiveness depends to a great extent on the specific design of the collar.
It is important to note that a price collar does not come without challenges. First, considering
political feasibility, quantity-based reforms are preferred to the price collar, which is perceived to be
similar to a tax. Second, there are implementation challenges of a price collar: while modeling seems
to be the most straightforward way to determine the relevant price range, there is significant
uncertainty between models, even when their underlying assumptions are harmonized. Careful
implementation will need to factor this in and find ways to determine a price range which is robust
across the spread of model outcomes. In addition, unforeseen events might change the conditions
on which the price collar was modeled, so it needs to be flexible enough to be adapted under such
circumstances without losing credibility. Arbitrary adjustments should be avoided and any changes
should be made transparent and performed on the basis of previously specified rules.
Reform options,
instruments and
measures
Market Stability
Reserve
Price collar
Expanding sectoral
coverage
Addressing carbon
leakage
Additional instruments
for inducing
innovation

Environmental
effectiveness 99

Dynamic efficiency

Political feasibility 100

o

o

+

At max price: At min price: +
o

+

-

+

-

+

+

+

o
(+ if enables more
ambitious cap in the
future)

+

+

Table 3: Evaluation of considered reform options. Evaluation of environmental effectiveness and dynamic efficiency
relates to changes relative to the status quo of EU ETS design. The reform proposal by the EU Commission is marked in
blue and the reform package proposed in this paper is marked in orange. Legend: “+” means high, “-“ means low and “o”
means indifferent. Smart revenue recycling policies have the potential to facilitate the expansion of the sectoral
coverage and of addressing carbon leakage by compensating industry for additional burdens.

Table 3 summarizes the evaluation of the reform proposals by the EU Commission and the reform
package proposed in this paper, according to the three different criteria introduced above. Our
analysis clarifies that in addition to the setting of a price collar, a comprehensive reform proposal is
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required. The sectoral expansion is an equally important cornerstone of a reform, as the associated
policy instruments will help stimulate innovation if there are additional market failures. Last, but not
least, expanding the group of countries that participate in the EU ETS or by linking the ETS to other
regions can address the concern of carbon leakage. All options differ in terms of political feasibility
(see Table 3). The proposed reforms could in principle be implemented before 2020, but given the
long lead-times, this does not seem to be politically feasible. The linear reduction factor is
independent of the concrete reform proposal and should be adjusted to be in line with an EU-wide
GHG target for 2030, once it is agreed upon.
We conclude that although setting a price collar might seem politically infeasible, it might be the
best way to tackle different problems at the same time. Or put it differently: the MSR might be a
politically feasible reform option but will most probably, in the end, turn out to be a “toothless tiger”
and no more than “backloading-de-luxe”.
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